“Blowback” and Responsibility: What America Owes Iran

“Blowback” and Responsibility: What America Owes Iran

POSTED: Wednesday, October 10, 2007
FROM BLOG: Britannica Blog - Geography - Britannica's blog on geography - where ideas matter.

The following blog post is from an independent writer and is not connected with Reuters News. The opinions and views expressed herein are those of the author and are not endorsed by Reuters.com.


More than half a century has passed since the United States deposed the only democratic government Iran ever had. As militants in Washington urge a second American attack on Iran, the story of the first one becomes more urgently relevant than ever. It shows the folly of using violence to try to reshape Iran.

Mohammad MossadeghIf the United States had not sent agents to depose Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh (right) in 1953, Iran would probably have continued along its path toward full democracy. Over the decades that followed, it might have become the first democratic state in the Muslim Middle East, and perhaps even a model for other countries in the region and beyond.

Before great powers take far-reaching decisions that can reshape the world, their leaders normally consider the lessons of history. Any serious discussion about modern Iran, and certainly any debate about whether the United States should intervene there, must include an assessment of what happened after the last intervention. In 1953, eager to achieve short-term goals, the US launched an operation that brought calamity on both Iran and itself. Some in Washington, however, reject the idea that this history has any relevance to the present era. They believe that this time, the United States can attack Iran and emerge triumphant.

Attacking Iran now, however, would turn that country’s oppressive leaders, who are now highly unpopular at home, into heroes of Islamic resistance; give them a strong incentive to launch a violent counter-campaign against American interests around the world; greatly strengthen Iranian nationalism, Shiite irredentism and Muslim extremism, thereby attracting countless new recruits to the cause of terror; undermine the democratic movement in Iran and destroy the prospects for political change there for at least another generation; turn the people of Iran, who are now among the most pro-American in the Middle East, into enemies of the United States; require the United States to remain deeply involved in the Persian Gulf indefinitely, forcing it to take sides in all manner of regional conflicts and thereby make a host of new enemies; enrage the Shiite-dominated government in neighboring Iraq, on which the US is relying on calm the violence there; and quite possibly disrupt the flow of Middle East petroleum in ways that could wreak havoc on Western economies.

These two countries are not fated to be enemies forever. In fact, they share many strategic goals and may even be seen as potential allies. Both desperately want to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. Both detest radical Sunni movements like al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Both, for different reasons, seek to assure a steady supply of petroleum to Western markets. Iran’s oil industry is in a parlous state and needs tens of billions of dollars in investment; the United States has huge reserves of capital and a voracious appetite for oil.

A new American approach to Iran should be based on direct, bilateral, and unconditional negotiations. Beyond that, it is in the urgent interest of the United States to promote all manner of social, political and economic contacts with Iranians. In a new climate, American businesses would no longer be forbidden to trade with Iran, but encouraged to do so. Rather than tightly restricting the number of visas issued to Iranians, the US would do the opposite: invite as many Iranians as possible to the United States, and flood Iran with Americans.

Unlike other countries in its neighborhood, Iran has been advancing toward democracy since adopting its first constitution more than a century ago. Iranian constitutions have not always been observed, and Iranian elections have not always been fair. Over this long period, however, the Iranian people have developed a deep understanding of what democracy means. Many thirst for it. There is more fertile ground for democratic change in Iran than in almost any other Muslim country.

Iranian President Mahmoud AhmadinejadSome in Washington argue that any new regime in Iran would be an improvement over the repressive and xenophobic mullahs. They are dangerously mistaken. An attack on Iran might well throw that country into chaos like that which has enveloped Iraq. In such an anarchic environment, there would be no central authority to control violent radicals. Most frighteningly, those radicals might include enraged nuclear technicians and scientists. The chance that Iranians might use their technological know-how to pass weapons of mass destruction on to terrorist groups would be far greater after an attack than it is now.

Bombing nuclear facilities in Iran — assuming they could all be found and destroyed — would be at best a temporary solution. It would almost certainly lead to the emergence of more terrifying threats than those Iran poses today. As the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammad alBaredei, likes to point out, buildings can be attacked and destroyed, but “you cannot bomb knowledge.”

By violently pushing Iran off the path to democracy in 1953, the United States created a whirlpool of instability from which undreamed-of threats emerged years later. A long American campaign of isolation, pressure and threats has produced no change in Iran’s behavior. Continuing it will mean a steady increase in tension that some in Washington believe should culminate in a military attack. Such an attack would usher in another era of upheaval in Iran and the surrounding region, this time with the overlay of nuclear-tinged terror.

Operation Ajax, as the CIA plot to depose Prime Minister Mossadegh was code-named, brought immeasurable tragedy to Iran, contributed to the rise of anti-American terror and, in the end, greatly weakened the security of the United States. Few episodes of 20th-century history more perfectly epitomize the concept of “blowback.” Today, as anti-Iran rhetoric in Washington becomes steadily more strident, it is more urgent than ever for Americans to understand how disastrous the last US attack on Iran turned out to be. They might also ponder the question of what moral responsibility the US has to Iran in the wake of this painful history.