Prisoner cannot sue for false imprisonment during prison officers unlawful strike

Prisoner cannot sue for false imprisonment during prison officers unlawful strike

Court of Appeal

Published January 6, 2010

Iqbal v Prison Officers Association

Before Lord Neuberger, Master of the Rolls, Lady Justice Smith and Lord Justice Sullivan

Judgment December 4, 2009

A prisoner whose daily routine of leaving his cell for the purpose of working, exercise and health care was disrupted by unlawful strike action by prison officers, resulting in the prisoner being confined to his cell, did not have a claim for false imprisonment against the officers.

The Court of Appeal so held in a reserved judgment, Lord Justice Sullivan dissenting, when allowing the appeal of the defendant, the Prison Officers Association, from Judge Shaun Spencer, QC, who, in Leeds County Court on November 13, 2008, allowed the claim of Mohammed Nazim Iqbal for damages for loss of liberty and associated distress sustained while in custody at Wealstun Prison for his alleged false imprisonment in his cell caused when prison officers there were directed by the defendant to strike on August 29, 2007. The judge awarded the claimant £5 damages.

Mr Michael Beloff, QC and Mr David Rivers for the association; Ms Phillippa Kaufmann and Mr Alex Gask for the claimant.

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS said that the claimant was a category C prisoner at the time, having been imprisoned for 15 years by Leeds Crown Court in June 2003.

The claim was that his normal routine of being allowed out of his cell between 8.45 and 11.45am and 5.45 and 7.45pm was interrupted when he was locked all day in his cell because of the refusal of prison officers to work at the prison in breach of contract on the relevant day.

The association’s contention that prison officers could not be liable for false imprisonment which occurred as a result of their inaction was supported by Herd v Weardale Steel, Coal and Coke Co Ltd ([1913] 3 KB 771). Unless there was a specific duty to act, arising out of the particular relationship between the claimant and defendant, as a general principle, a defendant was not to be held liable in tort for the result of his inaction.

`In the present case, the officers’ duty was owed to the prison governor or to their employer, not to the prisoners. They did not owe the latter a duty in tort to comply with the terms of the employment contracts, nor a duty not to withdraw their labour.

On August 29, 2007, the claimant had no right to leave the prison, nor even an arguable right to leave his cell, save as permitted by the governor. His confinement resulted in the governor’s decision when the officers withdrew their labour.

Although it must have been apparent to the officers that their action would probably mean that prisoners would enjoy less freedom of movement, there was no suggestion of an intention or wish that the prisoners, let alone the claimant, be confined to their cells as a result of the strike.

The rights of prisoners should certainly be acknowledged, but it better accorded both with principle and with practicality to limit their claims if locked in their cells by officers’ inaction to cases where the relevant officers were guilty of the tort of misfeasance in public office: Karagozlu v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ([2007] 1 WLR 1881, paragraph 50). That would ensure a prisoner was not without a remedy in an appropriate case.

The award of nominal damages was too low since the claimant suffered real loss in not being able to enjoy his customary limited freedom for some six hours. A sum of £120 would have been fair.

Lady Justice Smith delivered a concurring judgment.

LORD JUSTICE SULLIVAN, dissenting, said that the officers’ conduct in striking could not sensibly be described as a mere omission. While the right to strike was important, the right not to be falsely imprisoned was of fundamental importance.

Solicitors: Thompsons, Bristol; Harrison Bundey, Leeds.